Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality

Corazzini, Luca, Cotton, Christopher, Longo, Enrico and Reggiani, Tommaso ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3134-1049 2024. Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality. Journal of Public Economics 238 , 105172. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105172

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Abstract

We extend a collective action problem to study policy and project selection by heterogeneous groups who prefer to work together on a joint initiative but may disagree on which initiative is best. Our framework, adapted from a model of multiple threshold public goods, presents groups with several mutually exclusive projects, any of which require sufficient support from the group to succeed. Individuals strictly prefer to contribute where and how much they believe others expect of them to ensure joint project success. Groups tend to coordinate on the public good preferred by the wealthiest member, demonstrating a wealthy-interest bias even without corruption, politics, and information asymmetries. At the same time, groups divide costs in highly progressive ways, with the wealthy voluntarily funding a disproportionate share, helping offset the inherent inequality from endowment and selection differences. We discuss applications for policy selection, charitable giving, and taxes.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Multiple public goods, Donor heterogeneity, Crowdfunding, Lab experiment.
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0047-2727
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	21 July 2024
Date of Acceptance:	1 July 2024
Last Modified:	25 Jul 2024 15:16
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/170698

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