Lewis, James H. P.
2026.
Can reasons be irreducibly relational?
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
10.1017/can.2026.10104
|
Preview |
PDF
- Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (128kB) | Preview |
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2026.10104
Abstract
The irreducibility thesis is the view that there are some reasons for action whose normative force is not explained by the value of the actions for which they are reasons, but which must instead be explained in terms of some relation between agents. This view has been developed influentially by Stephen Darwall, Margaret Gilbert, and R. Jay Wallace. In this article, I argue that the normative force of any reason must be explained by the value of the action for which it is a reason, and so that the irreducibility thesis is false.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Date Type: | Published Online |
| Status: | In Press |
| Schools: | Schools > English, Communication and Philosophy |
| Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
| ISSN: | 0045-5091 |
| Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 23 December 2025 |
| Date of Acceptance: | 19 December 2025 |
| Last Modified: | 08 Sep 2026 10:58 |
| URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/183427 |
Actions (repository staff only)
 |
Edit Item |
Dimensions
Dimensions