Anti-dumping regulations: anti-competitive and anti-export

Collie, David Robert ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3132-648X and Le, Vo Phuong Mai ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3374-9694 2008. Anti-dumping regulations: anti-competitive and anti-export. [Working Paper]. Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff: Cardiff University.

Preview

PDF - Published Version Download (243kB) | Preview

Abstract

In a Bertrand duopoly model, it is shown that an anti-dumping regulation can be strategically exploited by the domestic firm to reduce the degree of competition in the domestic market. The domestic firm commits not to export to the foreign market which gives the foreign firm a monopoly in its own market. As a result the foreign firm will increase its price allowing the domestic firm to increase its price and its profits. If the products are sufficiently close substitutes then the higher profits in the domestic market are large enough to compensate for the loss of profits on exports.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Anti-dumping regulations; Bertrand oligopoly; strategic behaviour.
Publisher:	Cardiff University
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	30 March 2016
Last Modified:	20 Oct 2022 08:17
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/27819

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item