Embodiment and the perceptual hypothesis

McNeill, William ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3647-0720 2012. Embodiment and the perceptual hypothesis. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248) , pp. 569-591. 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00065.x

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

The Perceptual Hypothesis is that we sometimes see, and thereby have non-inferential knowledge of, others' mental features. The Perceptual Hypothesis opposes Inferentialism, which is the view that our knowledge of others' mental features is always inferential. The claim that some mental features are embodied is the claim that some mental features are realised by states or processes that extend beyond the brain. The view I discuss here is that the Perceptual Hypothesis is plausible if, but only if, the mental features it claims we see are suitably embodied. Call this Embodied Perception Theory. I argue that Embodied Perception Theory is false. It doesn't follow that the Perceptual Hypothesis is implausible. The considerations which serve to undermine Embodied Perception Theory serve equally to undermine the motivations for assuming that others' mental lives are always imperceptible.

Item Type:	Article
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN:	0031-8094
Last Modified:	24 Oct 2022 12:09
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/50729

Citation Data

Cited 22 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item