Best interest: a philosophical critique

Holm, Søren and Edgar, Andrew Robert ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4556-5147 2008. Best interest: a philosophical critique. Health Care Analysis 16 (3) , pp. 197-207.

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Abstract

On one conception of "best interest" there can only be one course of action in a given situation that is in a person's best interest. In this paper we will first consider what theories of "best interest" and rational decision-making that can lead to this conclusion and explore some of the less commonly appreciated implications of these theories. We will then move on to consider what ethical theories that are compatible with such a view and explore their implications. In the second part of the paper we will explore a range of possible criticisms of these views. And in the third part we will criticise the view that a court is always or even often in a good position to decide what the patient's best interest is. In the fourth and final part we will put forward a reconstructive proposal aimed at saving whatever is sound in the "best interest" conception.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Law English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) K Law > K Law (General)
Publisher:	Springer Verlag
ISSN:	1065-3058
Last Modified:	17 Oct 2022 09:56
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/6293

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