Hagendorff, Jens ![]() |
Abstract
Banks differ from non-financial firms. These differences affect the manner of agency conflicts between the various bank stakeholder groups compared with non-financial firms. However, the main corporate governance arrangements used in the banking industry to mitigate these agency conflicts are largely similar to those of non-financial firms. A case in point is executive compensation. No other major industry has less equity on the balance sheet than banking. However, executive pay in banking is linked to shareholder wealth just as in other industries, thus exacerbating existing incentives for bank managers to shift risk. This chapter reviews the literature on corporate governance in banking with a focus on those aspects of corporate governance in which banks (should) differ from non-financial firms, that is, executive compensation, the composition of the board of directors, ownership, and risk management. The chapter encourages a profound rethink of the corporate governance of banks.
Item Type: | Book Section |
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Book Type: | Authored Book |
Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | Business (Including Economics) |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | corporate governance, executive compensation, board of directors, ownership, risk management. |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
ISBN: | 9780199688500 |
Last Modified: | 28 Oct 2022 10:01 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/76446 |
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