Unemployment, crime and social insurance

Long, Iain ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3607-4031 and Polito, Vito 2014. Unemployment, crime and social insurance. [Working Paper]. Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff: Cardiff University.

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Abstract

We study an individual's incentive to search for a job in the presence of random criminal opportunities. These opportunities extenuate moral hazard, as the individual sometimes commits crime rather than searching. Even when he searches, he applies less effort. We then revisit the design of optimal unemployment insurance in this environment. If the individual is more likely to remain unemployed and unpunished when he commits crime than when he searches for a job (as suggested by empirical studies), declining unemployment benefits reduce the payoff from crime relative to that from searching. Compared to the canonical models of optimal unemployment insurance, this provides a further incentive to reduce benefits over time.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	Cardiff University
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	30 March 2016
Last Modified:	04 May 2023 14:27
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/78011

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