Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior

Ray, Indrajit ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5254-3144 1998. Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior. Review of Economic Design 3 (3) , pp. 257-269. 10.1007/s100580050016

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Abstract

We study the concept of correlated equilibrium within the framework of social situations (Greenberg 1990) and find that the unique optimistic stable standard of behavior (OSSB) of an appropriately defined correlated situation is nothing but the set of correlated equilibria. We generalize this situation in a natural way to accommodate coalitional deviations, and define the strong correlated situation. As the unique OSSB of this new situation, we derive a strong refinement of the set of correlated equilibria which we call strong correlated equilibrium. We analyse our concept and compare it with other existing notions using several examples. JEL classification: C72.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Correlated equilibrium, social situations, stable standard of behavior
Additional Information:	This paper is based on a chapter of my Ph. D. dissertation. An earlier version is available as CORE Discussion Paper no. 9411.
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	1434-4742
Funders:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain
Date of Acceptance:	6 October 1997
Last Modified:	31 Oct 2022 10:46
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/86076

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