Pre-emotional value awareness and the content-priority view

Mitchell, Jonathan 2019. Pre-emotional value awareness and the content-priority view. Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277) , pp. 771-794. 10.1093/pq/pqz018

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Abstract

Much contemporary philosophy of emotion has been in broad agreement about the claim that emotional experiences have evaluative content. This paper assesses a relatively neglected alternative, which I call the content-priority view, according to which emotions are responses to a form of pre-emotional value awareness, as what we are aware of in having certain non-emotional evaluative states which are temporally prior to emotion. I argue that the central motivations of the view require a personal level conscious state of pre-emotional value awareness. However, consideration of extant suggestions for the relevant type of evaluative state shows them all to be problematic. As such, I conclude that at present we do not have a persuasive formulation of the content-priority view, and that to get one defenders of the view need to specify which version they are committed to and defend it against the criticisms raised.<br>

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
ISSN:	0031-8094
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	20 October 2021
Last Modified:	28 Nov 2024 12:15
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/144429

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