Cardiff University | Prifysgol Caerdydd ORCA
Online Research @ Cardiff 
WelshClear Cookie - decide language by browser settings

Browse by Current Cardiff authors

Number of items: 34.

Mitchell, Jonathan 2026. The sensory dimension of episodic recollection. Erkenntnis
Item availability restricted.
filefile

Mitchell, Jonathan 2026. Peripersonal space as the haptic field. Synthese
Item availability restricted.
filefile

Mitchell, Jonathan 2025. Sartre’s exclusion claim: Perception and imagination as radically distinct consciousnesses. European Journal of Philosophy 33 (2) , pp. 682-699. 10.1111/ejop.13017
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2025. Towards affective-evaluativism: the intentional structure of unpleasant pain experience. Philosophical Quarterly 75 , pp. 693-717. 10.1093/pq/pqae002
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2025. The phenomenal contribution of attention. Inquiry 68 , pp. 513-544. 10.1080/0020174X.2022.2107061
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2025. Phenomenological disjunctivism. Ergo
Item availability restricted.
filefile

Mitchell, Jonathan 2024. The horizonal structure of visual experience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (2) , pp. 428-448. 10.1080/00048402.2023.2289114
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2024. A Nietzschean theory of emotional experience: Affect as feeling towards value. Inquiry 67 (1) , pp. 1-24. 10.1080/0020174X.2020.1850341
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2023. On the temporality of the emotions: An essay on grief, anger, and love, by Berislav Marušić [Book Review]. European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2) , pp. 534-538. 10.1111/ejop.12858
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2023. Emotion and attention. Philosophical Studies 180 , pp. 79-99. 10.1007/s11098-022-01876-5
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2023. Exploring affective evaluative horizons. Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (7-8) , pp. 36-60. 10.53765/20512201.30.7.036
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2022. Liking that it hurts: the case of the masochist and second-order desire accounts of pain’s unpleasantness. American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2) , pp. 181-189. 10.5406/21521123.59.2.06
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. Affective shifts: mood, emotion and well-being. Synthese 199 , pp. 11793-11820. 10.1007/s11229-021-03312-3
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. Experiencing mandates: Towards a hybrid account. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 10.1080/00048402.2021.1995013
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion. Philosophical Studies 178 , pp. 2635-2663. 10.1007/s11098-020-01567-z
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. The mind’s presence to itself: In search of non‐intentional awareness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10.1111/phpr.12804
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. Affective representation and affective attitudes. Synthese 198 , pp. 3519-3546. 10.1007/s11229-019-02294-7
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. Self-locating content in visual experience and the "here-replacement" account. Journal of Philosophy 118 (4) , pp. 188-213. 10.5840/jphil2021118414
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. Two irreducible classes of emotional experiences: Affective imaginings and affective perceptions. European Journal of Philosophy 10.1111/ejop.12648
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. Emotion as feeling towards value: a theory of emotional experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. The irreducibility of emotional phenomenology. Erkenntnis 85 , pp. 1241-1268. 10.1007/s10670-018-0075-8
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. Another look at mode intentionalism. Erkenntnis 10.1007/s10670-020-00314-4
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. The attitudinal opacity of emotional experience. Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280) , pp. 524-546. 10.1093/pq/pqz085

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience. Synthese 197 (7) , pp. 3087-3111. 10.1007/s11229-018-1872-y
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. Understanding meta-emotions: Prospects for a perceptualist account. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4) , pp. 505-523. 10.1017/can.2019.47

Mitchell, Jonathan 2019. Emotional experience and propositional content. Dialectica 73 (4) , pp. 535-561. 10.1111/1746-8361.12285
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2019. Pre-emotional value awareness and the content-priority view. Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277) , pp. 771-794. 10.1093/pq/pqz018
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2019. The varieties of mood intentionality. Breidenbach, Birgit and Docherty, Thomas, eds. Mood: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New Theories, New York, NY: Routledge,

Mitchell, Jonathan 2019. The intentionality and intelligibility of moods. European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1) , pp. 118-135. 10.1111/ejop.12385

Mitchell, Jonathan 2019. Can Evaluativism about unpleasant pains meet the normative condition? Inquiry 62 (7) , pp. 779-802. 10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562377

Mitchell, Jonathan 2017. A Nietzschean critique of metaphysical philosophy. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48 (3) , pp. 347-374. 10.5325/jnietstud.48.3.0347

Mitchell, Jonathan 2017. The epistemology of emotional experience. Dialectica 71 (1) , p. 84. 10.1111/1746-8361.12171
file

Mitchell, Jonathan 2017. Nietzsche on taste: Epistemic privilege and anti-realism. Inquiry 60 (1-2) , pp. 31-65. 10.1080/0020174X.2016.1251166

Mitchell, Jonathan 2016. Nietzschean self-overcoming. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (3) , pp. 323-350. 10.5325/jnietstud.47.3.0323

This list was generated on Thu Jan 29 10:16:11 2026 GMT.