ORCA
Online Research @ Cardiff

Clear Cookie - decide language by browser settings

Browse by Current Cardiff authors

Number of items: 31.

Mitchell, Jonathan 2025. The phenomenal contribution of attention. Inquiry 68 , pp. 513-544. 10.1080/0020174X.2022.2107061

Mitchell, Jonathan 2024. Sartre’s exclusion claim: Perception and imagination as radically distinct consciousnesses. European Journal of Philosophy 10.1111/ejop.13017

Mitchell, Jonathan 2024. The horizonal structure of visual experience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (2) , pp. 428-448. 10.1080/00048402.2023.2289114
Item availability restricted.

Mitchell, Jonathan 2024. Towards affective-evaluativism: the intentional structure of unpleasant pain experience. Philosophical Quarterly 10.1093/pq/pqae002

Mitchell, Jonathan 2024. A Nietzschean theory of emotional experience: Affect as feeling towards value. Inquiry 67 (1) , pp. 1-24. 10.1080/0020174X.2020.1850341

Mitchell, Jonathan 2023. On the temporality of the emotions: An essay on grief, anger, and love, by Berislav Marušić [Book Review]. European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2) , pp. 534-538. 10.1111/ejop.12858
Item availability restricted.

Mitchell, Jonathan 2023. Emotion and attention. Philosophical Studies 180 , pp. 79-99. 10.1007/s11098-022-01876-5

Mitchell, Jonathan 2023. Exploring affective evaluative horizons. Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (7-8) , pp. 36-60. 10.53765/20512201.30.7.036

Mitchell, Jonathan 2022. Liking that it hurts: the case of the masochist and second-order desire accounts of pain’s unpleasantness. American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2) , pp. 181-189. 10.5406/21521123.59.2.06

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. Affective shifts: mood, emotion and well-being. Synthese 199 , pp. 11793-11820. 10.1007/s11229-021-03312-3

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. Experiencing mandates: Towards a hybrid account. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 10.1080/00048402.2021.1995013

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion. Philosophical Studies 178 , pp. 2635-2663. 10.1007/s11098-020-01567-z

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. The mind’s presence to itself: In search of non‐intentional awareness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10.1111/phpr.12804

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. Affective representation and affective attitudes. Synthese 198 , pp. 3519-3546. 10.1007/s11229-019-02294-7

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. Self-locating content in visual experience and the "here-replacement" account. Journal of Philosophy 118 (4) , pp. 188-213. 10.5840/jphil2021118414

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. Two irreducible classes of emotional experiences: Affective imaginings and affective perceptions. European Journal of Philosophy 10.1111/ejop.12648

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. Emotion as feeling towards value: a theory of emotional experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. The irreducibility of emotional phenomenology. Erkenntnis 85 , pp. 1241-1268. 10.1007/s10670-018-0075-8

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. Another look at mode intentionalism. Erkenntnis 10.1007/s10670-020-00314-4

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. The attitudinal opacity of emotional experience. Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280) , pp. 524-546. 10.1093/pq/pqz085

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience. Synthese 197 (7) , pp. 3087-3111. 10.1007/s11229-018-1872-y

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. Understanding meta-emotions: Prospects for a perceptualist account. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4) , pp. 505-523. 10.1017/can.2019.47

Mitchell, Jonathan 2019. Emotional experience and propositional content. Dialectica 73 (4) , pp. 535-561. 10.1111/1746-8361.12285

Mitchell, Jonathan 2019. Pre-emotional value awareness and the content-priority view. Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277) , pp. 771-794. 10.1093/pq/pqz018

Mitchell, Jonathan 2019. The varieties of mood intentionality. Breidenbach, Birgit and Docherty, Thomas, eds. Mood: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New Theories, New York, NY: Routledge,

Mitchell, Jonathan 2019. The intentionality and intelligibility of moods. European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1) , pp. 118-135. 10.1111/ejop.12385

Mitchell, Jonathan 2019. Can Evaluativism about unpleasant pains meet the normative condition? Inquiry 62 (7) , pp. 779-802. 10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562377

Mitchell, Jonathan 2017. A Nietzschean critique of metaphysical philosophy. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48 (3) , pp. 347-374. 10.5325/jnietstud.48.3.0347

Mitchell, Jonathan 2017. The epistemology of emotional experience. Dialectica 71 (1) , p. 84. 10.1111/1746-8361.12171

Mitchell, Jonathan 2017. Nietzsche on taste: Epistemic privilege and anti-realism. Inquiry 60 (1-2) , pp. 31-65. 10.1080/0020174X.2016.1251166

Mitchell, Jonathan 2016. Nietzschean self-overcoming. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (3) , pp. 323-350. 10.5325/jnietstud.47.3.0323

This list was generated on Sat Mar 8 05:19:06 2025 GMT.