Understanding meta-emotions: Prospects for a perceptualist account

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. Understanding meta-emotions: Prospects for a perceptualist account. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4) , pp. 505-523. 10.1017/can.2019.47

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Abstract

This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as it captures some distinctive features of meta-emotions – specifically their normative dimension – while locating them within the domain of occurrent affective experiences. <br>

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
ISSN:	0045-5091
Last Modified:	01 Oct 2021 15:00
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/144431

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