On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience. Synthese 197 (7) , pp. 3087-3111. 10.1007/s11229-018-1872-y

PDF - Accepted Post-Print Version Download (339kB)

Abstract

Arguments for attributing non-conceptual content to experience have predominantly been motivated by aspects of the visual perception of empirical properties. In this article, I pursue a different strategy, arguing that a specific class of affective-evaluative experiences have non-conceptual content. The examples drawn on are affective-evaluative experiences of first exposure, in which the subject has a felt valenced intentional attitude towards evaluative properties of the object of their experience, but lacks any powers of conceptual discrimination regarding those evaluative properties. I also show that by accepting this thesis we can explain relevant features of evaluative understanding.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0039-7857
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	28 September 2021
Date of Acceptance:	8 July 2018
Last Modified:	07 Nov 2023 01:57
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/144433

Citation Data

Cited 4 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item