The attitudinal opacity of emotional experience

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. The attitudinal opacity of emotional experience. Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280) , pp. 524-546. 10.1093/pq/pqz085

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Abstract

According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the (apparent) objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
ISSN:	0031-8094
Last Modified:	28 Sep 2021 11:00
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/144434

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