Exploring affective evaluative horizons

Mitchell, Jonathan 2023. Exploring affective evaluative horizons. Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (7-8) , pp. 36-60. 10.53765/20512201.30.7.036

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Abstract

A key claim of classical phenomenology is that intentional experiences involve a distinctive kind of implicit intentionality, which accompanies the relevant explicit intentionality. This implicit intentionality is purportedly co-constitutive of the object-presenting phenomenology of those intentional experiences. This implicit intentionality is often framed by Husserl and other classical phenomenologists in terms of horizonal intentionality or intentional horizons. Its most interesting form is labelled the 'inner horizon'. My aim in this paper is to consider whether a case can be made for thinking that affective-evaluative experiences, predominately conscious emotions, exhibit a form of implicit intentionality in terms of an inner horizon. I suggest that one plausible way of motivating this idea is by reference to the normative phenomenology of the relevant experiences, in which particular objects' values are presented as either an ideal 'ought to be' or an ideal 'ought not to be'.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Publisher:	Imprint Academic
ISSN:	1355-8250
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	24 May 2023
Date of Acceptance:	1 May 2023
Last Modified:	01 Jan 2025 02:45
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/159917

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