Simple mediation in a cheap-talk game

Ganguly, Chirantan and Ray, Indrajit ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5254-3144 2023. Simple mediation in a cheap-talk game. Games 14 (3) , 47. 10.3390/g14030047

Preview

PDF - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (321kB) | Preview

Abstract

In the Crawford–Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of the N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of the N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that no such simple mediated equilibrium can improve upon the unmediated N-partition Crawford–Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	MDPI
ISSN:	2073-4336
Funders:	British Academy
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	13 June 2023
Date of Acceptance:	27 May 2023
Last Modified:	29 Jun 2023 10:43
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/160349

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item