Parakhnoyak, Alexei and Popov, Sergey V.  ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6899-9293
2025.
Same-sex marriage, the great equalizer.
Mathematical Social Sciences
, 102448.
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102448
|
Preview |
PDF
- Accepted Post-Print Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives. Download (888kB) | Preview |
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102448
Abstract
In a search and matching model with Nash bargaining, we find infinitely many asymmetric equilibria in which one sex receives a lower payoff than a similarly productive agent of the opposite sex. The mechanism resembles a social norm: if all agents on the opposite side of the marriage market become more demanding, continued searching yields diminished returns. However, if same-sex marriage is legalized and each side of the market includes a positive, arbitrarily small, share of bisexual agents, then only symmetric equilibria survive. This result highlights how restrictions on same-sex marriage reinforce asymmetries in opposite-sex matchings.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Date Type: | Published Online |
| Status: | In Press |
| Schools: | Schools > Business (Including Economics) |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HQ The family. Marriage. Woman |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0165-4896 |
| Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 15 July 2025 |
| Date of Acceptance: | 15 July 2025 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Aug 2025 10:25 |
| URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/179823 |
Actions (repository staff only)
 |
Edit Item |
Altmetric
Altmetric