Same-sex marriage, the great equalizer

Parakhonyak, Alexei and Popov, Sergey V. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6899-9293 2025. Same-sex marriage, the great equalizer. Mathematical Social Sciences 138 , 102448. 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102448

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Abstract

In a search and matching model with Nash bargaining, we find infinitely many asymmetric equilibria in which one sex receives a lower payoff than a similarly productive agent of the opposite sex. The mechanism resembles a social norm: if all agents on the opposite side of the marriage market become more demanding, continued searching yields diminished returns. However, if same-sex marriage is legalized and each side of the market includes a positive, arbitrarily small, share of bisexual agents, then only symmetric equilibria survive. This result highlights how restrictions on same-sex marriage reinforce asymmetries in opposite-sex matchings.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Schools > Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HQ The family. Marriage. Woman
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0165-4896
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	15 July 2025
Date of Acceptance:	15 July 2025
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2025 14:07
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/179823

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