Selfish routing in public services

Knight, Vincent Anthony ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4245-0638 and Harper, Paul Robert ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7894-4907 2013. Selfish routing in public services. European Journal of Operational Research 230 (1) , pp. 122-132. 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.04.003

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Abstract

It is well observed that individual behaviour can have an effect on the efficiency of queueing systems. The impact of this behaviour on the economic efficiency of public services is considered in this paper where we present results concerning the congestion related implications of decisions made by individuals when choosing between facilities. The work presented has important managerial implications at a public policy level when considering the effect of allowing individuals to choose between providers. We show that in general the introduction of choice in an already inefficient system will not have a negative effect. Introducing choice in a system that copes with demand will have a negative effect.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Mathematics
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Game theory; Queueing theory; Health care; OR in health services
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0377-2217
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	4 October 2017
Last Modified:	13 Nov 2024 19:00
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/48440

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