Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation

Awad, Edmond, Caminada, Martin W. A. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7498-0238, Pigozzi, Gabriella, Podlaszewski, Mikolaj and Rahwan, Iyad 2017. Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation. Journal of Logic and Computation 27 (8) , pp. 2581-2609. 10.1093/logcom/exx017

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Abstract

An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set of arguments should be evaluated. It is crucial not only to ensure that the outcome is logically consistent, but also satisfies measures of social optimality and immunity to strategic manipulation. This is because agents have their individual preferences about what the outcome ought to be. In the current paper, we analyze three previously introduced argument-based aggregation operators with respect to Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness under different general classes of agent preferences. We highlight fundamental trade-offs between strategic manipulability and social optimality on one hand, and classical logical criteria on the other. Our results motivate further investigation into the relationship between social choice and argumentation theory. The results are also relevant for choosing an appropriate aggregation operator given the criteria that are considered more important, as well as the nature of agents’ preferences.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Computer Science & Informatics
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
ISSN:	0955-792X
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	19 April 2017
Date of Acceptance:	27 March 2017
Last Modified:	16 Nov 2024 00:15
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/99961

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