Tenure-track contract helps self-selection

Popov, Sergey V. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6899-9293 2015. Tenure-track contract helps self-selection. Economics Bulletin 35 (4) , pp. 2482-2486.

Preview

PDF - Accepted Post-Print Version Download (128kB) | Preview

Abstract

Tenure-track contract is criticized for curbing the incentives to expend effort after obtaining tenured status. Yet the most productive faculties seem to work on a tenure contract, and schools which aim to employ the best faculty seem to prefer to offer tenure-track contracts to their new recruits. I argue that tenure-track contracts are by construction more attractive to more able freshly minted PhDs, and therefore the observed sorting is rationalizable.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Publisher:	Economics Bulletin
ISSN:	1545-2921
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	9 October 2017
Date of Acceptance:	21 November 2015
Last Modified:	13 Nov 2024 21:45
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/103247

Citation Data

Cited 2 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item