Simion, Mona ![]() ![]() |
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Abstract
According to the achievement account (AA) of the value of knowledge, knowledge is finally valuable because it is a species of a finally valuable genus, achievement. The achievement account is said to solve Pritchard’s tertiary value problem (TVP), the problem of showing that knowledge enjoys a different kind of value than mere true belief. This paper argues, first, that AA fails to solve TVP, and, second, that Pritchard’s motivations for TVP are inadequate. They do, however, motivate a weaker value problem, one that can be solved by showing that knowledge is weakly superior to mere true belief. Finally, third, we argue that knowledge does enjoy this form of weak superiority. Since this argument rests on AA’s key species-genus claim, AA can retain the upper hand in the debate.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Publisher: | University of Illinois Press |
ISSN: | 0003-0481 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 26 October 2017 |
Date of Acceptance: | 1 March 2015 |
Last Modified: | 21 Nov 2024 17:00 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/105977 |
Citation Data
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