Assertion: just one way to take it back

Simion, Mona ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7289-0872 2016. Assertion: just one way to take it back. Logos & Episteme 7 (3) , pp. 385-391. 10.5840/logos-episteme20167336

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Abstract

According to Jonathan Kvanvig, the practice of taking back one’s assertion when finding out that one has been mistaken or gettiered fails to speak in favour of a knowledge norm of assertion. To support this claim, he introduces a distinction between taking back the content of the assertion, and taking back the speech act itself. This paper argues that Kvanvig’s distinction does not successfully face close speech-act-theoretic scrutiny. Furthermore, I offer an alternative diagnosis of the target cases sourced in the normativity of action.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Institutul European
ISSN:	2069-0533
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	26 October 2017
Date of Acceptance:	1 April 2015
Last Modified:	03 Nov 2022 09:47
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/105978

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