Simion, Mona ![]() |
Abstract
When in the business of offering an account of the epistemic normativity of belief, one is faced with the following dilemma: strongly externalist norms fail to account for the intuition of justification in radical deception scenarios, while milder norms are incapable to explain what is epistemically wrong with false beliefs. This paper has two main aims; we first look at one way out of the dilemma, defended by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, and argue that it fails. Second, we identify what we take to be the problematic assumption that underlies their account and offer an alternative way out. We put forth a knowledge-first friendly normative framework for belief which grants justification to radically deceived subjects while at the same time acknowledging that their false beliefs are not epistemically good beliefs.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Published Online |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Publisher: | Wiley |
ISSN: | 1533-6077 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 26 October 2017 |
Date of Acceptance: | 10 June 2015 |
Last Modified: | 03 Nov 2022 09:47 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/105981 |
Citation Data
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