Epistemic presentism

Palermos, Spyridon Orestis ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0297-084X 2018. Epistemic presentism. Philosophical Psychology 31 (3) , pp. 458-478. 10.1080/09515089.2018.1432035

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Abstract

Commonsense functionalism is taken to entail a version of the extended mind thesis, according to which one’s dispositional beliefs may be partly constituted by artifacts. As several opponents of the extended mind thesis have objected, claiming so can generate a cognitive/knowledge bloat, according to which we may count as knowing the contents of trusted websites, even before looking them up (!). One way to retain commonsense functionalism, but avoid the ensuing “cognitive/knowledge bloat” worry is to introduce epistemic presentism—the view that there are no dispositional beliefs and that we can only believe, and thereby know, things in the present. Independently of the above problem, epistemic presentism can be further motivated by shedding light on two central epistemological questions: (1) how to understand the distinction between doxastic and propositional justification and (2) how to interpret the closure principle. The view also aligns with strong intuitions about what we may take ourselves to know, what the relation between action and belief is, and what may count as part of our minds.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis
ISSN:	0951-5089
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	9 November 2017
Date of Acceptance:	24 October 2017
Last Modified:	25 Nov 2024 13:15
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/106375

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