Assertion: knowledge is enough

Simion, Mona ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7289-0872 2016. Assertion: knowledge is enough. Synthese 193 (10) , pp. 3041-3056. 10.1007/s11229-015-0914-y

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Abstract

Recent literature features an increased interest in the sufficiency claim involved in the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-Suff). This paper looks at two prominent objections to KNA-Suff, due to Jessica Brown and Jennifer Lackey, and argues that they miss their target due to value-theoretic inaccuracies. It is argued that (i) the intuitive need for more than knowledge in Brown’s high-stakes contexts does not come from the epistemic norm governing assertion, but from further norms stepping in and raising the bar, and (ii) Lackey’s purported quality-driven case against KNA-Suff boils down to a quantitative objection. If that is the case, Lackey’s argument will be vulnerable to the same objections as Brown’s.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0039-7857
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	2 July 2019
Date of Acceptance:	11 September 2015
Last Modified:	01 Dec 2024 12:15
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/106615

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