Kelp, Christoph and Simion, Mona ![]() ![]() |
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil201711426
Abstract
In this paper, we develop a general normative framework for criticisability, blamelessness and blameworthiness in action. We then turn to the debate on norms of assertion. We show that an application of this framework enables champions of the so-called knowledge rule of assertion to offer a theoretically motivated response to a number of putative counterexamples in terms of blamelessness. Finally, we argue that, on closer inspection, the putative counterexamples serve to confirm the knowledge rule and disconfirm rival views.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Publisher: | Journal of Philosophy |
ISSN: | 0022-362X |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 23 February 2018 |
Last Modified: | 27 Nov 2024 08:30 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/106619 |
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