Palermos, S. Orestis ![]() ![]() |
Abstract
While mainstream epistemology has recently turned its focus on individual know-how (e.g., knowing-how to swim, ride a bike, play chess, etc.), there is very little, if any, work on group know-how (e.g., sports-team performance, jazz improvisation, knowing-how to tango, etc.). This chapter attempts to fill the gap in the existing literature by exploring the relevant philosophical terrain. It starts by surveying recent debates on individual knowledge-how and argues that group know-how (G-KH) cannot always be reduced to individual knowledge-how. Rather, certain cases of G-KH call for a non-reductive analysis. A natural place to look for a theory of irreducible G-KH is the literature on joint intentionality and distributed cognition. First, the chapter explores what a joint intentionality approach to G-KH might look like. Then it considers an alternative approach that views G-KH as a form of distributed cognition. Finally, the chapter discusses a potential link between the two approaches.
Item Type: | Book Section |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
ISBN: | 9780198801764 |
Last Modified: | 26 Apr 2024 09:45 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/106978 |
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