Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition

Carter, J. Adam and Palermos, S. Orestis ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0297-084X 2016. Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (4) , pp. 542-560. 10.1017/apa.2016.28

Preview

PDF - Accepted Post-Print Version Download (266kB) | Preview

Abstract

Philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010; Palermos 2014) have recently become increasingly receptive to the hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which external artifacts such as our laptops and smartphones can—under appropriate circumstances—feature as material realizers of a person's cognitive processes. We argue that, to the extent that the hypothesis of extended cognition is correct, our legal and ethical theorizing and practice must be updated by broadening our conception of personal assault so as to include intentional harm toward gadgets that have been appropriately integrated. We next situate the theoretical case for extended personal assault within the context of some recent ethical and legal cases and close with critical discussion

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press (CUP)
ISSN:	2053-4477
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	24 November 2017
Last Modified:	22 Nov 2024 03:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/106980

Citation Data

Cited 39 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item