Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents

Azacis, Helmuts ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6061-2100 2017. Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents. [Working Paper]. Working Paper No. E2017/16, Cardiff: Cardiff Economics Working Papers. Available at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/cdf/wpaper/2017-16.html

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Abstract

We study repeated implementation in a model with overlapping ge- nerations of agents. It is assumed that the preferences of agents do not change during their lifetime. A social choice function selects an alternative in each period as a function of the preferences of agents who are alive in that period. We show that any social choice function satisfying mild necessary conditions is repeatedly implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium if there are at least three agents and they live sufficiently long.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Publisher:	Cardiff Economics Working Papers
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	9 January 2018
Last Modified:	03 Nov 2022 10:22
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/107801

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