The market for non-executive directors: does acquisition performance influence future board seats?

Mira, Svetlana ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7321-4104, Goergen, Marc ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4391-2651 and O'Sullivan, Noel 2019. The market for non-executive directors: does acquisition performance influence future board seats? British Journal of Management 30 (2) , pp. 415-436. 10.1111/1467-8551.12290

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Abstract

This paper investigates whether non-executive directors associated with good (bad) board decisions are subsequently rewarded (penalized) in the market for directors. This question is addressed by assessing whether the post-acquisition performance of acquiring companies influences the number of non-executive directorships that non-executives involved in these acquisitions hold subsequent to the acquisition. We find that non-executives on the boards of acquirers that increase (omit or cut) their dividend subsequently hold more (fewer) non-executive directorships in listed companies. Our findings suggest that the non-executive labor market is efficient and rewards (penalizes) non-executives for good (bad) acquisitions.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Additional Information:	This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
Publisher:	Wiley
ISSN:	1045-3172
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	7 February 2018
Date of Acceptance:	21 January 2018
Last Modified:	05 May 2023 23:40
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/108921

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