Simion, Mona ![]() ![]() |
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Abstract
In recent years, much attention has been given to the epistemic credentials of belief based on moral testimony. Some people think pure moral deference is wrong, others disagree. It comes as a surprise, however, that while the epistemic responsibilities of the receiver of moral testimony have been closely scrutinized, little to no discussion has focused on the epistemic duties of the speaker. This paper aims to supply this lack: it defends a function-first account of the normativity of moral assertion. According to this view, in virtue of its function of reliably generating understanding in the audience, a moral assertion that p needs be knowledgeable and accompanied by a contextually appropriate explanation why p.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Published Online |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Publisher: | Springer Verlag |
ISSN: | 1386-2820 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 8 February 2018 |
Date of Acceptance: | 11 August 2018 |
Last Modified: | 05 May 2023 09:17 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/108980 |
Citation Data
Cited 6 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data
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