Simion, Mona ![]() ![]() |
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1681-3
Abstract
In recent literature, a very popular position about the normativity of assertion claims that standards for epistemically proper assertion vary with practical context, while standards for knowledge do not. This paper shows this claim is strongly incompatible with the received value-theoretic view regarding the relationship between the axiological and the deontic: one of the two has to go.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Publisher: | Springer |
ISSN: | 0039-7857 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 26 February 2018 |
Date of Acceptance: | 4 January 2018 |
Last Modified: | 24 Nov 2024 19:30 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/109441 |
Citation Data
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