Caring for esteem and intellectual reputation: some epistemic benefits and harms

Tanesini, Alessandra ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6250-471X 2018. Caring for esteem and intellectual reputation: some epistemic benefits and harms. Philosophy 84 , pp. 47-67. 10.1017/S1358246118000541

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Abstract

This paper has five aims: it clarifies the nature of esteem and of the related notions of admiration and reputation (sect. 1); it argues that communities that possess practices of esteeming individuals for their intellectual qualities are epistemically superior to otherwise identical communities lacking this practice (sect. 2) and that a concern for one’s own intellectual reputation, and a motivation to seek the esteem and admiration of other members of one’s community, can be epistemically virtuous (sect. 3); it explains two vices regarding these concerns for one’s own intellectual reputation and desire for esteem: intellectual vanity and intellectual timidity (sect. 4); finally (sect. 5), it offers an account of some of the epistemic harms caused by these vices.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	Published
Schools:	Schools > English, Communication and Philosophy
Additional Information:	Supplementary Volume on Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
ISSN:	0031-8191
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	12 June 2018
Date of Acceptance:	8 June 2018
Last Modified:	01 Dec 2024 11:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/112194

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