Tanesini, Alessandra ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6250-471X
2018.
Arrogance, anger and debate.
Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences [Special issue on Skeptical Problems in Political Epistemology, edited by Scott Aikin and Tempest Henning]
5
(2)
, pp. 213-227.
10.5840/symposion20185217
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Abstract
Arrogance has widespread negative consequences for epistemic practices. Arrogant people tend to intimidate and humiliate other agents, and to ignore or dismiss their views. They have a propensity to mansplain. They are also angry. In this paper I explain why anger is a common manifestation of arrogance in order to understand the effects of arrogance on debate. I argue that superbia (which is the kind of arrogance that is my concern here) is a vice of superiority characterised by an overwhelming desire to diminish other people in order to excel and by a tendency to arrogate special entitlements for oneself, including the privilege of not having to justify one’s claims.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Date Type: | Publication |
| Status: | Published |
| Schools: | Schools > English, Communication and Philosophy |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Publisher: | Academia Romana, Filiala Iasi, Institutul de Cercetari Economice si Sociale Gheorghe Zane |
| ISSN: | 1584-174X |
| Related URLs: | |
| Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 3 July 2018 |
| Date of Acceptance: | 29 June 2018 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Nov 2024 17:15 |
| URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/112898 |
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