Gray, Richard ![]() |
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Abstract
Tracking representationalism explains the negative affective character of pain, and its capacity to motivate action, by reference to the representation of the badness for us of bodily damage. I argue that there is a more fitting instantiation of the tracking relation – the badness for us of extremely intense stimuli – and use this to motivate a non‐reductive approach to the negative affective character of pain. The view of pain proposed here is supported by consideration of three related topics: the pain caused when the body is damaged, reparative pain and the messenger‐shooting objection to tracking representationalism.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Publisher: | Wiley |
ISSN: | 0279-0750 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 6 November 2018 |
Date of Acceptance: | 15 October 2018 |
Last Modified: | 12 Nov 2024 20:30 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/116505 |
Citation Data
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