Methodological issues in the neuroscience of moral judgement

Kahane, Guy and Shackel, Nicholas ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1751-1400 2010. Methodological issues in the neuroscience of moral judgement. Mind and Language 25 (5) , pp. 561-582. 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01401.x

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Neuroscience and psychology have recently turned their attention to the study of the subpersonal underpinnings of moral judgment. In this article we critically examine an influential strand of research originating in Greene's neuroimaging studies of ‘utilitarian’ and ‘non-utilitarian’ moral judgement. We argue that given that the explananda of this research are specific personal-level states—moral judgments with certain propositional contents—its methodology has to be sensitive to criteria for ascribing states with such contents to subjects. We argue that current research has often failed to meet this constraint by failing to correctly ‘fix’ key aspects of moral judgment, criticism we support by detailed examples from the scientific literature.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) Q Science > Q Science (General)
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN:	0268-1064
Last Modified:	18 Oct 2022 12:58
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/11884

Citation Data

Cited 81 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item