Repeated implementation: a practical characterization

Azacis, Helmuts ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6061-2100 and Vida, Péter 2019. Repeated implementation: a practical characterization. Journal of Economic Theory 180 , pp. 336-367. 10.1016/j.jet.2019.01.002

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Abstract

We characterize the social choice functions that are repeatedly implementable. The necessary and sufficient condition is formulated in terms of the equilibrium payoff set of an associated repeated game. It follows that the implementability of a function can be tested numerically by approximating the equilibrium payoff set. Additionally, with the help of our characterization, we demonstrate that an efficient function is implementable if and only if it satisfies a weaker version of Maskin monotonicity. As an application, we prove that utilitarian social choice functions are implementable by showing that continuation payoff promises effectively play the role of side-payments, which are needed for implementation in static setups.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Additional Information:	Released with a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives License (CC BY-NC-ND)
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0022-0531
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	26 January 2019
Date of Acceptance:	20 January 2019
Last Modified:	14 Nov 2024 23:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/118849

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