Thomas, Lee ![]() ![]() |
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Abstract
Redesign of energy system governance processes will become necessary, owing to technological and societal change. The emergence of both smart metering systems and smart contract platforms provides opportunities for system regulators to re-define roles and responsibilities. In particular, self–enforcing programmatic incentive structures can be created and implemented. This paper presents a smart contract oriented general architectural model for public electricity networks. It defines the monopoly roles within the system and a framework for instantiation of economic games between metered participants. An example incentive system that creates a whole system Schelling point around demand-generation balance is presented. A number of potential benefits of the proposed regulatory model and incentive system, over existing regulatory structures, are described – they include a lower barrier of entry for balancing participation, improved prediction, increased resilience to cascading voltage collapse, and reduced regulatory complexity
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Status: | Unpublished |
Schools: | Engineering |
Subjects: | T Technology > TK Electrical engineering. Electronics Nuclear engineering |
Funders: | EPSRC |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 6 February 2019 |
Last Modified: | 25 Oct 2022 13:14 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/119249 |
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