Alonso, Jose M. and Andrews, Rhys ![]() |
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Abstract
We argue that governing parties can use privatization as a political discipline mechanism to reward core constituents and swing voters by diverting unwanted social and economic costs to other places. We test this argument by analysing the dispersal of asylum seekers across English local authorities before and after the Conservative Party-led privatisation of the dispersal system in 2011. Our findings suggest that asylum dispersals to Labour Party “core” constituencies increased following privatization, but that dispersals to “swing” districts were unchanged. Dispersals to places with high institutional capacity decreased, despite contractors being expected to settle asylum seekers in such areas.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | Business (Including Economics) |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
ISSN: | 0034-3404 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 13 July 2020 |
Date of Acceptance: | 8 July 2020 |
Last Modified: | 09 Nov 2023 12:17 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/133405 |
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