Insider lobbying and government contracts: the moderating role of firm size

Alonso, Jose M. and Andrews, Rhys ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1904-9819 2022. Insider lobbying and government contracts: the moderating role of firm size. European Management Review 19 (3) , pp. 462-475. 10.1111/emre.12484

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Abstract

This study examines insider lobbying as a form of relational Corporate Political Activity (CPA) that can be used by firms to gain an advantage in the competition for government contracts, and how firm size moderates the effectiveness of different insider lobbying strategies. Drawing on a unique dataset that captures meetings between private companies and British government ministers, we find that both the breadth and depth of insider lobbying are positively related to the value of the contracts awarded by the UK Ministry of Defence. Further analysis reveals that the benefits from a strategy of lobbying depth are stronger for small firms, than those from a strategy of lobbying breadth. The findings suggest that the bridging and bonding social capital cultivated through meetings with politicians can be deployed in alternative ways by different-sized firms.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Publisher:	Palgrave Macmillan / Wiley
ISSN:	1740-4754
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	28 July 2021
Date of Acceptance:	27 July 2021
Last Modified:	17 Nov 2024 02:00
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/142969

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