Emotional experience and propositional content

Mitchell, Jonathan 2019. Emotional experience and propositional content. Dialectica 73 (4) , pp. 535-561. 10.1111/1746-8361.12285

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Abstract

Those arguing for the existence of non-propositional content appeal to emotions for support, although there has been little engagement in those debates with developments in contemporary theory of emotion, specifically in connection with the kind of mental states that emotional experiences are. Relatedly, within emotion theory, one finds claims that emotional experiences per se have non-propositional content without detailed argument. This paper argues that the content of emotional experience is propositional in a weak sense, associated with aspectual experience and correctness conditions. Furthermore, it provides an interpretation of purely-objectual emotional experiences which satisfies this weak view of propositional content.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Wiley
ISSN:	0012-2017
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	20 October 2021
Last Modified:	01 Dec 2024 18:06
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/144427

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