Emotional intentionality and the attitude-content distinction

undefined 2019. Emotional intentionality and the attitude-content distinction. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2) , pp. 359-386. 10.1111/papq.12270

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Abstract

Typical emotions share important features with paradigmatic intentional states, and therefore might admit of distinctions made in theory of intentionality. One such distinction is between attitude and content, where we can specify the content of an intentional state separately from its attitude, and therefore the same content can be taken up by different intentional attitudes. According to some philosophers, emotions do not admit of this distinction, although there has been no sustained argument for this claim. In this article, I argue that the way values figure in emotional experience qualifies the content of emotional experience such that the attitude-content distinction cannot be applied.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Wiley
ISSN:	0279-0750
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	20 October 2021
Last Modified:	21 Nov 2024 14:15
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/144428

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