Another look at mode intentionalism

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. Another look at mode intentionalism. Erkenntnis 10.1007/s10670-020-00314-4

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Abstract

A central claim in contemporary philosophy of mind is that the<br>phenomenal character of experience is entirely determined by its content. In this paper, I consider an alternative I call Mode Intentionalism. According to this view, phenomenal character outruns content. It does so because the intentional mode contributes to the phenomenal character of the experience. Here I assess phenomenal contrast arguments in support of this view. I argue that the phenomenal contrast cases appealed to allow for interpretations which do not require positing intentional modes as phenomenologically manifest aspects of experience.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Additional Information:	This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made.
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0165-0106
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	28 September 2021
Date of Acceptance:	18 August 2020
Last Modified:	06 May 2023 19:38
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/144432

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