Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience. Synthese 197 (7) , pp. 3087-3111. 10.1007/s11229-018-1872-y |
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Abstract
Arguments for attributing non-conceptual content to experience have predominantly been motivated by aspects of the visual perception of empirical properties. In this article, I pursue a different strategy, arguing that a specific class of affective-evaluative experiences have non-conceptual content. The examples drawn on are affective-evaluative experiences of first exposure, in which the subject has a felt valenced intentional attitude towards evaluative properties of the object of their experience, but lacks any powers of conceptual discrimination regarding those evaluative properties. I also show that by accepting this thesis we can explain relevant features of evaluative understanding.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Publisher: | Springer |
ISSN: | 0039-7857 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 28 September 2021 |
Date of Acceptance: | 8 July 2018 |
Last Modified: | 07 Nov 2023 01:57 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/144433 |
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