The irreducibility of emotional phenomenology

Mitchell, Jonathan 2020. The irreducibility of emotional phenomenology. Erkenntnis 85 , pp. 1241-1268. 10.1007/s10670-018-0075-8

PDF - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (873kB)

Abstract

Emotion theory includes attempts to reduce or assimilate emotions to states such as bodily feelings, beliefs-desire combinations, and evaluative judgements. Resistance to such approaches is motivated by the claim that emotions possess a sui generis phenomenology. Uriah Kriegel defends a new form of emotion reductivism which avoids positing irreducible emotional phenomenology by specifying emotions’ phenomenal character in terms of a combination of other phenomenologies. This article argues Kriegel’s approach, and similar proposals, are unsuccessful, since typical emotional experiences are constituted by sui generis feelings towards value.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Additional Information:	This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0165-0106
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	28 September 2021
Date of Acceptance:	15 October 2018
Last Modified:	11 May 2023 22:49
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/144436

Citation Data

Cited 5 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item