The mind’s presence to itself: In search of non‐intentional awareness

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. The mind’s presence to itself: In search of non‐intentional awareness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10.1111/phpr.12804

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Abstract

According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co-presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential-presence in terms of a form of non-intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non-intentional experiential-presence, are considered and are shown to encounter significant problems. The fact that a plausible account of the non-intentional awareness which experience putatively has of itself cannot be framed with reference to such forms of awareness is grounds for scepticism concerning the cogency of non-intentional experiential presence.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Additional Information:	This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Publisher:	Wiley
ISSN:	0031-8205
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	27 September 2021
Date of Acceptance:	5 May 2021
Last Modified:	10 May 2023 15:22
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/144437

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