Self-locating content in visual experience and the "here-replacement" account

Mitchell, Jonathan 2021. Self-locating content in visual experience and the "here-replacement" account. Journal of Philosophy 118 (4) , pp. 188-213. 10.5840/jphil2021118414

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Abstract

According to the Self-Location Thesis, certain types of visual experiences have self-locating and so first-person, spatial contents. Such self-locating contents are typically specified in relational egocentric terms. So understood, visual experiences provide support for the claim that there is a kind of self-consciousness found in experiential states. This paper critically examines the Self-Location Thesis with respect to dynamic-reflexive visual experiences, which involve the movement of an object toward the location of the perceiving subject. The main aim of this paper is to offer an alternative interpretation of these cases which resists attributing them self-locating content, arguing for a replacement of the de se component with a non-conceptual equivalent of the indexical ‘here’. In its final section, the paper also considers an extension of the h-replacement account to cases of visual kinesthesis.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Publisher:	Journal of Philosophy
ISSN:	0022-362X
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	22 October 2021
Date of Acceptance:	23 February 2021
Last Modified:	23 Nov 2024 12:00
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/144955

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