A Nietzschean theory of emotional experience: Affect as feeling towards value

Mitchell, Jonathan 2024. A Nietzschean theory of emotional experience: Affect as feeling towards value. Inquiry 67 (1) , pp. 1-24. 10.1080/0020174X.2020.1850341

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Abstract

This paper offers a Nietzschean theory of emotion as expressed by following thesis: paradigmatic emotional experiences exhibit a distinctive kind of affective intentionality, specified in terms of felt valenced attitudes towards the (apparent) evaluative properties of their objects. Emotional experiences, on this Nietzschean view, are therefore fundamentally feelings towards value. This interpretation explains how Nietzschean affects can have evaluative intentional content without being constituted by cognitive states, as these feelings towards value are neither reducible to, nor to be thought along the lines of, judgements, perceptions, or other mental states.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Publisher:	Routledge
ISSN:	0020-174X
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	22 October 2021
Date of Acceptance:	5 May 2020
Last Modified:	10 Nov 2024 04:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/144957

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