Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences

Ahmad, Ghufran ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2454-9335 2021. Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences. Games and Economic Behavior 126 , pp. 136-162. 10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.004

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Abstract

I consider the housing market problem with weak preferences. In this context, I provide a sufficient condition for weak group strategy proofness; no group of agents can jointly misreport their preferences such that each agent in the group becomes better-off. Using this sufficient condition, I prove that the top trading absorbing sets, top cycles, and highest priority object rules satisfy weak group strategy proofness. Thus, this paper establishes that it is possible to achieve weak group strategy proofness, along with other desirable results, for the housing market problem with weak preferences even though group strategy proofness is incompatible with Pareto efficiency in this setting.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0899-8256
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	16 February 2023
Date of Acceptance:	30 December 2020
Last Modified:	14 Nov 2024 12:15
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/157074

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