Nietzschean moral error theory

Hassan, Patrick 2021. Nietzschean moral error theory. History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (4) , 375–396. 10.5406/21521026.38.4.05

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Abstract

Nietzsche has sometimes been interpreted as endorsing an error theory about moral judgements. A host of passages provide prima facie reason for such an interpretation. However, the extent of the appropriateness of this interpretation is a matter of dispute. The parameters of his alleged error theory are unclear. This paper reconsiders the evidence for the view that Nietzsche is a moral error theorist and makes the case that Nietzsche defends a local theory about a particular form of “morality,” but that a global error theory about value judgments in general is not established by the textual evidence. This view is defended by considering Nietzsche's affinities with Hume and how they are better harnessed in service of a projectivist error-theoretic reading as opposed to alternatives in the secondary literature (such as noncognitivist readings). Moreover, it explores how Nietzsche can continue to make genuine (that is, nonfictionalist) evaluative judgments by his drawing of a distinction between conventional evaluative practice expressive of herd morality on the one hand and a revisionary evaluative practice available to a small number of “higher types” or “free spirits” on the other.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	University of Illinois Press
ISSN:	0740-0675
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	28 March 2023
Date of Acceptance:	1 July 2021
Last Modified:	05 Dec 2024 18:06
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/157966

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